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1. Mathematics in the social sciences
Mathematical activity can be seen as originating in response to two kinds
of stimuli. For definiteness, and not very imaginatively, let us refer to them
as internal and external stimuli, respectively. The kind of work is moti-
vated by internal stimuli focusses on problems which come, as it were, in
mathematical form, and whose solutions are subject solely to the success
criteria of the particular area (or areas) of mathematics within which the
problem has arisen. A substantial part of the so-called “pure mathematics”
falls squarely within this category, though we hasten to add that we find
the “pure” vs. “applied” terminological and conceptual divide more mislea-
ding than helpful. The second kind of stimulus to mathematical work comes
from the attempt at solving problems which originate outside the area(s) of
mathematics in which they are solved. The domains in which the question
arise can be extremely varied and may relate both to applications (e.g. in
engineering, medicine, etc.) and to theoretical scientific questions. Among
the latter one can distinguish the sort of mathematics which is motivated
by the natural sciences – mainly physics, chemistry and biology – from the
kind of mathematics which develops in response to the questions posed by
the social sciences.
The distinction we are putting forward, rough as it may be, is motivated
by the following observation. Within the natural sciences, the phenomenon
which constitutes the object of scientific investigation is completely charac-
terised by its mathematical description. So, for example, Euler’s equations
for the dynamics of physical systems, rather than providing a “mathematical
model” of something which isn’t mathematical, do constitue in themselves
the description of the phenomenon of interest. Contrast this with the social
sciences where the mathematical formalisation of its key concepts can often
be seen as the culmination of a historically complex process of abstraction
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which, in some cases, may lead to stripping out important aspects of the
phenomenon of interest. A particularly relevant case in point, on which
more below, is provided by the hypotheses on the agents’ rationality which
can be found in virtually every emanation of mathematical economics, and
in particular, in general equilibrium theory. Assuming that individuals are
omniscient and logically infallible is something methodologically very dif-
ferent from considering frictionless motion. To assume that consumers are
omniscient is to model something other than the individuals which act in
the “real” market. The ensuing loss of predictive power of a theory based
on such modelling assumption becomes then all too obvious and calls for a
careful methodological analysis.
Before moving on with the formulation of a specific question concerning the
role of mathematics in the social sciences, we must remind readers that the
tradition which ultimately culminated in modern mathematical economics
takes the relation between natural and social sciences to be quite different
from the rendering we have just put forward. Indeed for a large portion of
the twentieth century the justification for the mathematical modelling in the
social sciences consistently pivoted on physical analogies. Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), to make a very notable example, noted how the controversial
notion of homo economicus should be regarded as the pure economics coun-
terpart of the abstraction with which rational mechanics reduces bodies to
points. Such abstractions, says Pareto in [8] are “similar” and are motivated
by “similar needs”. Interestingly, Pareto adds a footnote to the word “simi-
lar” referring to he paper in which Vito Volterra (1860-1940) introduces his
Prey-predator model.
Similar considerations are put forward by von Neumann e Morgenstern in
[10] in connection with the introduction of the concept of utility. This con-
cept, to which we now refer as “von-Neumann and Morgestern utility” pro-
vides a key part of the language of contemporary mathematical economics.
We could list many more notable examples, certainly not confining ourselves
to the past century. Let us just observe, as an aside, that analogy, in pro-
blems of quantitative finance, has been replaced with a fusion of economics
and finance, giving rise to the field known as econophysics.
Going back to our main theme, the purpose of this note is to articulate
some necessarily rough and sketchy reflections on mathematical modelling
in the social sciences. The focus of our attention will be restricted to the
central problem of the theory of social choice and welfare. The development
will be informal and space limitations will force us to gloss over a number
of important questions. We refer interested readers to consult [3] for the
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mathematical precise details and its bibliography for the bigger picture.
2. Mathematical economics and the illusion of the efficient
self-organisation of society
Problem What is the best way to allocate economic resources within a
given society?
Building on the common roots of social choice and welfare problems we
will refer to the above simply as to the problem of social choice. This is
undoubtedly one of the key problems in economic theory and its history can
be traced back easily to the political arithmetics of revolutionary France.
Given its centrality, it should not come as a surprise that the main political
ideologies of our time can sometimes be told apart according to the point
of view they take on the formulation of the problem of social choice, and
consequently, on the relative attempts at providing a solution to it.
According to a view which is promoted mainly by the right-wing libertarians,
the solution to the problem of social choice is contained in a mathematical
argument which revolves around the fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics. Informally, this view takes social welfare to be the product of the
interaction – within a free market – of rational individuals who are moti-
vated solely by the satisfaction of their (economic) goals. It goes without
saying that the relevance and importance of the theorem with respect to
the problem of social choice depend centrally on the interpretation and the
justification of the mathematical modelling which ultimately leads to its
formulation. A central modelling hypothesis in this respect falls under the
general term of methodological individualism. The idea, roughly, consists in
assuming that the analysis of society as a whole can be reduced (without
loss of explanatory power) to the analysis if its ultimate components, namely
individual rational agents. This rather abstract concept is one of the most
significant items of the Enlightenment’s Nachlass to the social sciences, and
indeed a concept which plays a central role in a number of distinct areas.
The key idea is that rational agents – which in various cases will take the
guise of consumers, voters or players – are characterised by their own pre-
ferences over the socio-economic alternatives of interest. This identification
allows us to put the multifaceted and subtle concept of “rationality” in the
rigorous, albeit restrictive, terms of the logical coherence of preferences. As
a major consequence of this framework, rational decision can be identified
with maximising behaviour in suitably specified contexts. Hence, with a
handful of seemingly quite innocent conceptual steps, the concept of ratio-
nality, both individual and collective, can be formalised in such a way as
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to make the problem of social choice amenable to mathematical treatment
and, possibly, solution.
Before illustrating informally the fundamental theorem of welfare economics,
it is worth pausing for a second to note the consonance between conceptual
framing of social choice provided by methodological individualism and the
vision put forward by G.W. Leibniz concerning the algorithmic nature of
ideal reasoning. For one of the inventors of modern logic any controversy
between two philosophers about which he writes:
For it would suffice for them to get their pencils, sit down
each to his abacus and (urged by a friend, if they please so )
say to one another: Calculemus!
Indeed we will be investigating the conditions which are necessary and suf-
ficient for a society’s rational preferences, i.e. those representing the will
and well-being of the collectivity, to be obtained as the value of a suitable
function which takes as argument the preferences of the rational individuals
which belong to that society.
If such a formal mechanism existed, it could well put forward a serious
claim for defining rigorously a central aspect of the concept of democracy.
Desirable as this may be however, such a functional aggregation mechanism
cannot exist. This is indeed the conclusion of a series of results which,
starting with an observation of the Marquis de Condorcet, culminated in
modern times in the well-known Arrow Theorem [1]. Roughly the theorem
asserts the following:
Theorem 1. Consider a society of at least two rational agents who mu-
st express their preferences on at least three alternatives. It is impossible
to aggregate logico-mathematically the individual preferences into a collec-
tive preference which while satisfying the principle of Unanimity does not
coincide with the dictatorship of one individual.
To provide a rigorous formulation of this theorem, which will also help us
appreciate some basics of mathematical modelling, we need a little notation
and some definitions. Suppose S is a society consisting of n individuals, each
of whom is identified with a preference ordering, that is to say a relation <i
defined on the set X = {X,Y, . . .} of social alternatives. We assume that <i
satisfies the following:
Ordering: <i satisfies
• reflexivity : X <i X ∀X
• transitivity : if X <i Y and Y <i Z then X <i Z;
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• completeness: for each pair (X,Y ) exactly one of the following
holds: either X <i Y or Y <i X.
Suitable considerations based on methodological individualism lead us to
define an aggregation rule which takes individual preferences <i with i =
1, . . . , n as argument, and which gives as value the social preference <S . In
other words we are interested in rules satisfying the condition of
Functionality: For each pair of social alternatives in X 2, R is of the
form
<S= R(<1, . . . ,<n).
Note that Ordering and Functionality correspond essentially to requiring
that the solution to the problem of social choice be of a logico-mathematical
nature. It is not hard to see, in this regard, that the condition of Ordering
which defines rationality both at the individual and social level, is rooted in
the logical – and hence purely formal – concept of coherence. Functionality,
on the other hand, is closely reminiscent of the compositionality (or truth-
functionality) of the classical propositional calculus, and this latter provides
a language in which the whole problem of social choice, and indeed Arrow’s
own theorem, can be fruitfully reformulated. (Again, we refer the interested
reader to [3] for more details.)
In addition to the requirements of coherence – i.e. of formal correctness
– that we have just introduced, in order for the aggregation rule R to be
materially adequate with respect to the intended interpretation of “social
choice”, further constraints of economic and political nature must be intro-
duced. In other words we want to make sure that the mathematical model
under construction is a model wich bears direct relevance to social choice,
rather than being merely an abstract (albeit interesting) exercise. Here is
where the distinction between natural and social sciences discussed in the
previous section becomes central. The kind of constraints to be imposed on
R will be clearly external to mathematics, and yet they will be quite far
from providing an exhaustive description of the phenomenon of interest (in
contrast to the example of motion recalled above). Mathematical modelling
in the social sciences requires its own methodology.
Since a direct formalisation of the concept of “social choice” appears too
daunting to even try, a rather natural alternative route consists in the ex-
clusion of those situations which appears to be blatantly inconsistent with
the most basic intuitions related to the concept of social choice. In other
words our aim is to justify the desirable properties of R by arguing that
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they prevent us from incurring in a process of aggregation which satisfies
properties that we do not want R to satisfy
The first undesirable such property is quite clearly that R identifies social
choice with the unilateral preference of one member of the society. That is
to say we impose the axiom of
Non-dictatorship: For no i = 1 . . . , n,
R(<1, . . . ,<n) =<i .
A rule which did not output as social choice the preference unanimously
held by all members of the society would likewise be clearly inadequate. To
rule this situation out we require that R satisfies the axiom of
Unanimity: If X <i Y with i = 1 . . . , n then X <S Y .
Finally a constraint which originates directly from the methodological indi-
vidualism assumption. It is undesirable that, the aggregation of individual
preferences on alternatives X and Y , depended on something other than the
individual preferences on X and Y . More precisely we impose the axiom of
Independence: Suppose that <i and %i are two families of orderings
with i = 1, . . . , n, and suppose that both satisfy the condition of
Functionality <S := R(<1, . . . ,<m) and %S := R(%1, . . . ,%m). Then
X <i Y ⇔ X %i Y, ∀i
implies
X <S Y ⇔ X %S Y.
Intuitively, the condition says that if two distinct preference profiles coincide
on social alternatives X and Y , then we do not want R to produce distinct
aggregations of the two profiles. This condition, which in various guises
occupies centre stage in the mathematics of social sciences, is often referred
to as Independence of irrelevant alternatives. Indeed any aggregation rule
R satisfying int, dismisses as irrelevant the information contained in the
preference profile <i e %i on alternatives other than X and Y .
Arrow’s theorem establish the mutual incompatibility of the conditions of
Ordering Functionality, Non-dictatorship, Unanimity and Independence. A
particularly enlightening formulation of the theorem is as follows:
Theorem 2 (Arrow, 1950). Suppose Ordering and Functionality hold, and
suppose that R satisfies Non-dictatorship and Unanimity. Then R cannot
satisfy Independence.
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Put in this way this much celebrated result sheds interesting light on the
impossibility of addressing the problem of social choice in a purely logico-
mathematica way: if we have good reasons to impose the remaining condi-
tions, we must necessarily give up Independence. And with this, we must
abandon the requirement to the effect that the aggregation of individual
preferences – in close analogy with the Calculemus – is sufficient to deter-
mine the preference of the whole society without any external intervention
.
Theorem 2 therefore provides us both with a diagnosis and with a suggestion
as to how the impossibility of the logico-mathematica aggregation may be
overcome within an Arrovian framework. As illustrated in the next section,
this happens by weakening increasingly the methodological individualism
hypothesis, and in particular its instantiation based on the condition of
Independence.
3. The fundamental theorem of welfare economics
Arrow’s theorem provides an admirable illustration of the contribution brought
by mathematics to the formulation of specific problems in the social scien-
ces. As the informal discussion of the previous section suggests, the role of
mathematical analysis is mainly to ensure the internal coherence of the mo-
del as a consequence of the rigorous and careful scrutiny of its fundamental
assumptions. As pointed out by Bruno De Finetti [2]
Used critically and accompanied by a reflection on the con-
crete features and problems of the portion of reality which
it aims at modelling, mathematics is a [. . . ] constructive
analytical tool because it is hard to tame and often leads
to destruction: those contradictions, inconsistencies, discon-
tinuities, asymmetries which could otherwise go unnoticed
to those who limited themselves to imagine mental or ver-
bal descriptions, are clearly brought to light by to those who
consider the mathematical model[. . . ]
The contradiction brought to light by the Arrow theorem is about the mutual
incompatibility of hypotheses which, at first sight, have nothing incompati-
ble about them. To the contrary both appear to be natural and compelling,
especially to those who believe in the market’s ability to self-regulate and
to promote social welfare through purely individual incentives.
We therefore must replace some of the hypotheses which give rise to Arrow’s
framework with others capable of leading us to a solution to the problem
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of social choice. As anticipated, we will focus mainly on the assumption of
methodological individualism. Before getting into any of the details, we must
provide some further background on the Arrow-Debreu model of abstract
economy.
Consider a specific instance of the general problem of social choice, that is
to say the allocation of l commodities (which we assume are available in a
total quantity Ω) to the n individuals which belong to society S. In this
context, Arrow’s theorem tells us that any allocation satisfying Ordering,
Functionality, Non-dictatorship and Unanimity will necessarily violate In-
dependence – a logico-mathematical solution cannot exist unless we allow in
the evaluation an external element with respect to the individual preferences
on the social alternatives. It turns out that a kind of comparison between
individual preferences allows to make an important step forward towards the
solution. Such a comparison – which is not permitted within the Arrovian
framework – is made mathematically possible by a set of results which lie at
the heart of mathematical economics. Those results identify the necessary
and sufficient conditions under which the following are proved to be logical-
ly equivalent: (i) the representation of the individual agents’ preferences by
means of orderings and (ii) their representation by means of suitable utility
functions.1
This allows us to make quite some progress. For an individual in society
can now be identified with a suitable real-valued utility function, and very
naturally, we may press on to take say, the function
uS = u1 + . . .+ un
to represent the collective preference of society. Now we can reiterate the
representation of preferences, that is given two social alternatives X and Y
(1) X <S Y, if and only if uS(X) ≥ uS(Y ),
means that society prefers X to Y just when the social utility of Y is not
greater than that of X.2 In general this representation is obtained up to a
choice of parameters, in the sense that we can always write aggregate utility
1Indeed, under rather mild conditions, every ordering can be represented
(non-uniquely) by suitable utility functions.
2As anticipated above, the concept of utility is central in virtually all mathematical
models in the social sciences. And yet cavalier interpretations often lead to misunderstan-
ding which we do not have the space to prevent here. To this end we refer the reader to
[3] and in particular to Chapters 3 and 4.
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functions as
uαS = α1u1 + . . .+ αnun, αi ≥ 0 ∀i,
n∑
1
αi = 1.
The continuity of the utility functions which we take into consideration gua-
rantees, via Weierstrass’s Theorem, that for each α the function uαS attains a
maximum Xα in the domain of social alternatives (which are now interpre-
ted as possible allocations) X . By the equivalence (1), this provides us with
enough background to define a fundamental concept of mathematical as well
as political economics, namely Pareto efficiency. Before giving its definition
however, recall that given a preference ordering <⊆ X 2 (i.e. a reflexive,
transitive and total relation over the social alternatives) it is completely
standard to define:
• ∼ (the indifference relation) by letting
X ∼ Y ⇔ X < Y and Y < X;
•  (the asymmetric part of %) by letting
X  Y ⇔ X < Y but not (X ∼ Y ).
Definition 1. Say that X is a weak Pareto maximum (optimum) if the
following is satisfied:
( P’) @Y ∈ X such that Y i X ∀i.
Say that Y is a strict Pareto maximum (optimum) if the following is satisfied:
(P) 6 ∃Y ∈ X such that Y <i X ∀i and Y j X for some j.
Intuitively, a social alternative is efficient, in the sense of being a Pareto
maximum or optimum, if it increases the utility of at least one member of
society without making anyone else worse off. Under the hypothesis that in-
dividual and social utility functions describe completely3 what is relevant to
the individual and to society as a whole – clearly not a innocent assumption
– an efficient allocation in the sense of Pareto cannot be improved upon. A
moment’s reflection is sufficient however to see how the criterion of Pareto
efficiency may lead to clearly unfair outcomes as it rules out as inefficient
any kind of redistribution of the economic resources within society. Once
again we are forced to refer the interested reader to [3] for further ethico-
political reflections on Pareto efficiency and urge those with an interest in
the topic to consult [9] which also contains a very detailed list of references.
3Think again about Euler’s equation for the motion of physical systems.
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Let us resume then our quest for a mathematical solution to the problem of
social choice by illustrating the key contribution of Pareto efficiency. Under
suitable technical conditions on the individual preference orderings, one can
prove that for each social alternative Y ∈ X , there exists a strict Pareto
maximum X ∈ X which is unanimously preferred to Y ∈ X , that is one
such that X <i Y , with i = 1, . . . , n. Under the hypothesis to the effect
that Pareto efficiency singles out “the best” allocations of economic resources
to society, the above guarantees the existence of a solution to the problem of
social choice in which a form of interpersonal preference comparisons is now
possible. This form of comparison, it is worth emphasising, means giving up
some of the strictness of the Independence assumption which leads to the
Arrow theorem. It is easy to guess however that this solution is far from
being unique and the Paretian framework within which the solution is found,
provides us with no further formal criterion for the selection of one among
the many Pareto optima. Again, for the identification of a concrete solution
to the problem of social choice we need further external intervention.
To this end we enrich the Paretian model with the concept of private pro-
perty. In addition to their own preferences over the social alternatives, each
member of society i is now endowed with a commodity bundle ωi ∈ X . We
assume that the totality of commodities, denoted by Ω = ω1 + . . .+ ωn has
been distributed among the n individuals.
The introduction of private property gives us an opportunity to say some-
thing more about the hypothesis of methodological individualism. In par-
ticular we are assuming that i’s individual preferences (and hence utilities)
are purely self-centered in the sense that ui depends only on the commodity
bundle ωi (and only on that.) This leads to a private property economy,
arguably the simplest context in which the notion of a market makes full
sense. Indeed a commodity is such insofar as there is someone who finds
it desirable. Therefore the introduction of private property gives us some
elbow room to reformulate the problem of social choice as the problem of
exchange of private commodities. In this enriched context, the interpersonal
comparison among individuals which emerged in the Paretian framework
gains further importance.
The idea is roughly as follows. Each individual possesses a commodity bund-
le whose worth (measured in utilities) is assumed to be additive. A concept
which arises naturally in this situation is that of a coalition to which the
individual agents participate to the extent that the coalition promotes their
self-centered interests. The mathematical analysis of coalitions within a pri-
vate property market has many interesting consequences, but this is not
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the best place to discuss them. We just limit ourselves to mentioning that,
in a suitably specified context, we can associate to each private property
economy a cooperative game and investigate the problems arising in the for-
mer by applying the solution concepts of the latter.4 Note in passing that
this provides an enlightening illustration of the role of mathematics in the
construction of economic models. Indeed a significant portion of the theory
of cooperative games (or coalitional games) developed as a consequence of
an external stimulus, to reiterate the terminology used in the first section,
namely by the problem of identifying the conditions under which the core of
private property economy is non-empty. This, in turn, gave rise to a series of
results, mainly of geometric and topological nature, which litte, if anything
at all, have to do with the initial economic interpretation. To give the reader
a feel for the situation we are alluding to, let us just mention that the well
known Shapley theorem – a key result in cooperative games – implies the
theorems of Knaster, Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz, which imply Brower’s
fixed-point theorem, which in turn (a posteriori) turns out to be equivalent
to Shapley’s own theorem.
Let’s go back to private property economies. A characteristic feature of
coalitions is that they can block those Pareto optima which are considered
not to be in the coalition’s best interests. Such are those allocations which,
if realised, would lead to a smaller value (in utilities) than the sum of the
utilities which the individuals could secure independently of the coalition.
Against this background, and under suitable technical conditions, in addi-
tion to the assumption to the effect that each individual may belong, to a
certain degree, to multiple coalitions (referred to as fuzzy coalitions), one
can prove the existence of prices which are associated to the commodity
bundles.
An important observation is in order. In the abstract economies (with priva-
te property) which constitute the background to this result, prices emerge as
a purely formal consequence of the economic interaction among self-centered
agents. In other words prices are “chosen” by the market. Thus if one could
prove that prices obtained in this way do indeed promote social welfare, one
could reasonably claim to possess a strong argument in favour of (a suitably
adapted version of) methodological individualism, indeed one which is pret-
ty much in line with the free-market narrative. To some, this is precisely
the contribution of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Before
stating and discussing its relevance informally, we need to introduce a final
set of concepts.
4Full details are available from [3].
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The analysis of coalitions led to the determination of prices in terms of
(the coefficients associated to) the allocations which belong to the core W
of fuzzy coalitions. As a preliminary observation note that, under suitable
conditions, one can prove that fuzzy coalitions do not block all efficient
allocations in the sense of Pareto. That is to say W is non-empty. The
language and results of game theory allow us to characterise W rigorously
in terms of Walras equilibria. To do so suppose that a particular price
system is given for the abstract economy of interest. By making some extra
assumptions on the self-centered rationality of economic agents, namely that
they always prefer more wealth to less – note that the price system allows
us to measure wealth interpersonally – we can prove that any allocation in
the fuzzy core is logically equivalent to an allocation which is in equilibrium
with respect to a suitable price system.
The concept of equilibrium featuring here is essentially the one which de-
veloped in the context of neoclassical economics, and which was formulated
rigorously for the first time by Leon Walras (1834-1910). In essence, it
amounts to the requirement that the demand and supply commodities must
be balanced. Building on this, one can show that every equilibrium in the
sense of Walras is efficient in the sense of Pareto. If one also assumes that
a suitable redistribution of the initial commodities is possible, the converse
can also be proved, namely that Pareto optima are themselves Walras equi-
libria. That gives us, in essence, the statement of the Fundamental Theorem
of Welfare Economics:
Theorem 3 (Hotelling-Allais-Arrow-Debreu). Suppose all the initial re-
sources have been allocated to rational, self-centered agents (who possess
a certain quantity of each commodity) then
(1) every Walras equilibrium is a Pareto optimum and
(2) conversely, every Pareto optimum is a Walras equilibrium with re-
spect to a price system and a redistribution of the commodities.
Let us recap the story so far, and let us do so while keeping in mind that,
contrary to what may be suggested by our highly informal and simplified
exposition, the historical development of the methods and concepts which
culminated in Theorem 3 has been far from linear. We started by asking
whether one could argue mathematically for or against a certain way of ma-
king public decisions, that is to say decisions involving social welfare. We
took it for granted that our (of the present writers, probably of the readers,
and reasonably of a substantial part of the population) cultural background
leads us naturally to give preference to the point of view which, for lack of
a better word, we have been calling democratic. In other words we would
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like decisions about social welfare to depend suitably (!) on the will of the
individuals which constitute society. Motivated by such ideas, we briefly
touched upon the most significant steps leading to the construction of the
Arrovian framework and to the ensuing impossibility of devising a logico-
mathematical method of aggregating individual preferences into the will of
society. However, by weakening the hypothesis of methodological individua-
lism a new path unfolded before us, this time based on Pareto efficiency.
Trying to refine the selection of Pareto optima through the formation of
coalitions of individuals motivated uniquely by the maximisation of their
own personal utility, and owing to the introduction of private property, we
arrived at the determination of a price system for which the market is to be
considered as the only responsible. Theorem 3 tells us that market-set prices
are efficient in the sense of Pareto, and conversely, that Pareto optima lead
to equilibrium prices. Since this result generalises to the economy with pro-
duction, the question naturally arises as to wether this proves, as a practical
corollary of the Fundamental Theorem, that the best way to promote social
welfare is indeed to incentivise the pursuit of individual welfare within a free,
competitive market. Put otherwise, have we proved the existence and the
intrinsic efficiency of the invisible hand put forward by the founding father
of Modern Economics, Adam Smith?
According to the point of view which we articulated in this note, the answer
can be affirmative only to the extent that we are willing to accept all the
assumptions and hypotheses used in the construction of the mathematical
model as a complete characterisation (in the sense illustrated in the first
section) of the phenomena of interest. However there are several reasons to
doubt that strong arguments can be put forward to that effect, except pos-
sibly for some “local” versions. Let us illustrate the idea starting with with
some relatively obvious considerations on the nature of economic agents.
• Economic omniscience: A necessary condition for the derivation of
Theorem 3 states that each individual consumer knows the price
of each commodity, at every fixed place and time. Clearly if this
hypothesis is ever to be satisfied, it can only be in very special cir-
cumstances, relative that is to a given commodity bundle at one
specific place, etc.
• Logical omniscience: Contrary to the hypotheses concerning ideal
rationality (as they are captured by the identification of rational de-
cision with the maximisation of subjective utility) consumers often
violate the logical criteria of rationality – and, as observed by beha-
vioural economists, they do so very predictably. As Jonathan Swift
put it men aren’t quite rational animals, but rather animals which
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are capable of being rational.
• Perfect liquidity : Likewise necessary is the assumption to the effect
that each consumer is always in a position to buy or sell the desired
quantities of commodities at market price. This is again an utterly
unrealistic hypothesis which is virtually impossible to satisfy in real-
world economies. There cannot be, for a start, any guarantee that
commodities will be available on the market when desired.
Therefore, pace Pareto, irrationality, i.e. the deviation from the logical
criteria of coherence and maximisation, isn’t quite friction. To neglect it, is
to strip away a characteristic feature of the object of scientific inquiry for
which the model is being constructed.
But even if homo economicus gave way in mathematical economics to a
more earthly homo heuristicus – as envisaged by the Bounded Rationality
research project5 – why should we ever believe that the result of economic ac-
tivity in free markets really possesses the characteristic properties of Walras
equilibria? The proof of the existence, within the model, of a price system
in equilibrium certainly does not amount the proof that those prices which
are observed in a real-world economy coincide with those balancing supply
and demand. Again let us illustrate informally the reasons why caution, if
not scepticism, is in order when evaluating such an identification.
• Black Box : The concept of Walras equilibrium doesn’t provide us
with any information as to the actual mechanisms governing mar-
kets. It rather refers us to decidedly unrealistic devices, like the
Walrasian Auctioneer, which essentially amounts to the following.
An auctioneer announces a price p; if this turns out not be the equi-
librium price, he then chooses another price q with qk < pk, in case
of positive demand excess in pk, and qk > pk, in case of negative
excess demand, until the equilibrium is reached. Whilst mathemati-
cally this corresponds to a powerful tool, it is clearly unrealistic to
think of equilibrium as arising at the same time in all markets, and
for all consumers.
• Experimental testability : Last, but certainly not least: can we test
the predictions of general equilibrium theory experimentally? The
question is far from trivial. Suffice it to recall here the contribution
of Hugo Sonnenschein who, during the 1970s, raised the question
in the following terms. Is methodological individualism sufficient to
provide non trivial, experimentally testable constraints on aggregate
5See e.g. [4].
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excess demand as well as on market demand? A number of specia-
lists (including Rolf Ricardo Mantel, Ge´rard Debreu, Pierre Andre´
Chiappori e Ivar Ekeland) responded negatively, showing how equili-
brium theory is generally ill-suited to produce empirically falsifiable
predictions. The last word on this intriguing and highly complex
issue is however far from having been written.
4. Conclusions
Essentially the same arguments which lead us to a form of scepticims con-
cerning the actual consequences, for the problem of social choice, of the
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics appear to lead us to a more
general form of scepticism, which concerns the relation between mathemati-
cal models in the natural and social sciences. Arrow, Debreu, Shapley – not
to mention Milnor, von Neumann, Nash, and many more– gave fundamental
contributions to the development of economic theory, and by doing so, often
gave rise to new research areas in mathematics. Hence there’s absolutely no
doubt concerning the primary role played by mathematics in the quest for a
solution to the fundamental problem of social choice considered in this note.
However, by the line of reasoning that we outlined above(and discussed
in more detail in [3]), the role of mathematics is neither hegemomic nor
self-sufficient. The mathematical formalisation of the problem of optimal
allocation of economic resources within society tells us which paths we must
avoid, on pain of inconsistency. But the right-wing libertarians’s belief that
the mathematical analysis will eliminate all but one solution – the solution
according to which social welfare is obtained solely as a consequence of the
promotion of individual interests – doesn’t seem to be justified at all.
The failure of the paths centered on methodological individualism however
should not be taken as a proof of the futility of the initial question. To
the contrary, it must be taken as a stimulus to devote greater efforts to
developing more adequate methods (and less culturally entrenched ones at
that) and ultimately a better theory. Our analysis does in fact suggest the
indispensability of a formal framework, but it also suggests its insufficien-
cy to the theoretical understanding of social welfare (and consequently its
principled, practical realisation).
Hence is only seems reasonable to insist that the formal results of mathe-
matical economics should always be accompanied with a careful conceptual
and experimental analysis of the social phenomena of interest. Those, in
turn, should be based on an uninterrupted debate in which the members
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of society oppose, with tolerance, their points of view. In short, a collecti-
ve deliberation process capable of taking into account the intrinsic cultural
diversity and the intrinsic multiplicity of the possible answers. This collec-
tive deliberation would ideally aim at improving our understanding of social
phenomena and ultimately contribute to a better education for society as a
whole. Armed with this renewed understanding, society could then aim at
an ever increasing freedom.
The goal is therefore highly ambitious, and the path to it is dotted with
tricky concepts and technical difficulties. Daunting as this might sound, not
only do we think that this path is viable, but also that it is necessary for us
to take it. Thus we leave our final words to Amartya Sen, who argues with
the typical elegance, along very similar, though perhaps slightly broader,
lines:
The remedy for bad reasoning lies in better reasoning, and
it is indeed the job of reasoned scrutiny to move from the
former to the latter. It is also possible that in some state-
ments of ‘Enlightenment authors’ the need for reassessment
and caution was not sufficiently emphasized, but it would be
hard to derive from that any general indictment of the En-
lightenment outlook, and even more, an arraignment of the
general role of reason in just behaviour or good social policy.
[9]
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